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Elizabeth Miller 
 
Abstract: I argue that Schaffer fails to provide a non-question-begging argument 
for priority monism. Despite his suggestion to the contrary, Humean 
pluralists need not, and plausibly do not, endorse his tiling constraint on 
metaphysically basic objects. Moreover, the distinction between 
supervenience—of the sort at issue in Humean doctrine—and 
metaphysical necessitation—of the sort at issue in Schaffer’s tiling 
constraint—points toward an alternative treatment of the phenomena 
initially inspiring Schafferian monism. There is an important possibility, 
one that Humeans can or should embrace, that Schaffer overlooks when 
drawing his monistic conclusion. 
 
For Jonathan Schaffer, the really interesting debate is between not monists and pluralists 
about “existence” but monists and pluralists about “fundamental mereology” (Schaffer 2010a, 
33). Most of us can agree that there are lots of concrete objects.1 Many also agree that these 
objects stand related as parts and wholes. We even can distinguish a maximal whole, the cosmos, 
subsuming all actual concrete objects as parts. Still, this leaves room for disagreement about “the 
mereological order of whole and part”—and so, for Schaffer, about relations of metaphysical 
dependence among our sundry existents. Which if any of the many concrete things that exist are 
crucially “independent” of the others? This is the “central question” of fundamental mereology. 
For Schaffer, answering this question involves limning our world’s more complete 
metaphysical, not merely mereological, structure. Among all concrete objects, the mereologically 
fundamental ones are those that play a starring role in the ultimate metaphysical explanations of 
our cosmic contents. According to priority pluralists, multiple objects share this role, collectively 
grounding the actual decoration of space-time. As a result, priority pluralists embrace pluralism 
about fundamental mereology: they take physical reality to comprise multiple separate, 
independent constituents. Schaffer, in contrast, is a monist about fundamental mereology. On his 
 
1 Importantly, though, not everyone does: for a recent defense of existence monism, see Della Rocca 2020.  
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view, there is one fundamental object, the cosmos, which subsumes all other concrete things as 
interdependent parts. Priority monists take such cosmic fundamentality to reflect the top-down 
order of worldly metaphysical explanation. The global whole has a unique explanatory role: it is 
“the ultimate grounds on which all else depends” (Schaffer 2010b, 346).  
Central to Schaffer’s argument for monism is his “tiling” constraint, which imposes some 
necessary conditions on his base: metaphysically basic objects are “complete” but “minimal” 
(Schaffer 2010a, 40). According to Schaffer, our actual world does, or at least could, include 
some distinctive “emergent” or “internally related” contents (2010a, 2010b). Attempting to 
divide such contents over multiple tiles leads to incompleteness or redundancy (non-minimality). 
Given the tiling constraint, then, there cannot be multiple metaphysically basic objects: instead, 
our cosmic whole is uniquely prior to everything else.  
However, Schaffer’s opponents need not, and plausibly do not, accept his tiling constraint 
to begin with. As a result, Schaffer does not offer pluralists, specifically Humean pluralists, any 
non-question-begging argument for his monistic conclusion.2 Moreover, the Humean distinction 
between global supervenience and metaphysical sufficiency points us towards an alternative 
treatment of the—internally related and emergent—worldly phenomena that inspire Schafferian 
monism to begin with. There is an important possibility, one that Humeans can or should 
embrace, that Schaffer overlooks when drawing his monistic conclusion. 
1. Mereological structure and the tiling constraint 
 Suppose we set out to detail the contents of my office: Ava the dog, the rug beneath her, 
one wet nose, a furry tail, and so on. But we want to avoid double—or triple, or worse—counting. 
 
2 I characterize such pluralists as “Humean” to associate them with the Lewisian doctrine of “Humean 
supervenience”—but not (necessarily) with any commitments of the historical David Hume (cf. Lewis 1986, ix-x). 
See Strawson 2015 for a discussion of the (arguably tenuous) link between contemporary “Humeanism”  and 
Hume’s own philosophical outlook.     
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There is exactly one tail in this room, and if Ava is on our list, we already have it covered.3 One 
option is to start by cataloguing everything we can think of—dogs, rugs, noses, tails—in as much 
detail as we can, and then add information about mereological relations among items in our 
catalogue. Both Ava the dog and some tail exist, but the latter is a proper part of the former. So 
despite being two—in some sense—separable concrete entities, Ava and her tail are not distinct 
objects. One telltale sign of their metaphysical connection is the modal coordination between 
their features: necessarily, Ava’s nose has the intrinsic property of being adorably freckled just in 
case Ava has the intrinsic property of having an adorably freckled nose.  
A different strategy lists only some limited inventory of special concrete ingredients and 
then lets general metaphysical principles fill out the rest of our story. Start with that nose, this 
tail, and these four paws. Given the principles of mereology and property inheritance at work in 
our world, even this sparse selection takes us a long way. Specify the intrinsic properties of each 
object, along with any fundamental relations between them, and we metaphysically suffice for a 
further—though not entirely distinct—concrete entity: their mereological sum. Given the 
principles of property inheritance at work in this world, that whole has the intrinsic property of 
having more paws than noses as parts. And our initial selection comes with metaphysical 
ramifications in the other direction too. By explicitly including Ava’s nose, we implicitly bring 
along various smaller parts of an adorable nosey fusion: two small freckles, many tiny cells, and 
even more even tinier atoms. 
When it comes to characterizing our entire cosmos, Schaffer favors a version of the 
second strategy: we start with some sparse inventory of basic ingredients and let the laws of 
metaphysics fill in the rest. With which ingredients do we start? Schaffer takes his tiling constraint 
 
3 For the purposes of this discussion, I am assuming that Ava the dog is a material object: roughly, the mereological 
sum of the cells currently occupying this small region near my feet. For the record, Ava is skeptical. 
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to place lower bounds on our initial selection: basic objects are complete yet minimal. Motivating 
this constraint is his vision of the base as a “blueprint for reality” (Schaffer 2010a, 39). Basic 
objects are complete, collectively “covering” all concrete contents of space-time: with the laws of 
metaphysics in the background, “duplicating all these [basic] entities, while preserving their 
fundamental relations, metaphysically suffices to duplicate the cosmos and its contents” (Schaffer 
2010a, 39).  
The blueprint is not redundant, however: basic objects are minimal. Consider again the 
contents of my office, roughly all and only the concrete objects in some region R of space-time. 
To cover these, we do not need to include both Ava and her nose: once we have Ava, we already 
have anything her nose might possibly contribute. Schaffer traces his prohibition on mereological 
overlap to a background conception of basic objects as “independent units of being (building 
blocks, as it were)” (Schaffer 2010a, 40). Overlapping objects exhibit modal coordination among 
their features, while distinct building blocks do not. Minimality demands enough modal 
independence between basic objects that each is strictly essential for completeness: each member 
of the base helps to cover some cosmic contents for which others, by themselves, do not suffice. 
Schaffer emphasizes that we are guaranteed such independence among freely recombinable 
objects. With such a selection, “any combination of ways that each entity can be individually is a 
way that the plurality can be collectively” (Schaffer 2010a, 40).  
2. Basic tessellation and metaphysical explanation 
For Schaffer, completeness and minimality are only necessary, not sufficient, conditions 
on the base. That is, let a tessellation of some contents be any selection of concrete objects, or tiles, 
from among them that satisfies Schaffer’s tiling constraint. In principle, some candidate contents 
can have multiple tessellations. According to Schaffer, though, only one will pick out the genuine 
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metaphysical basis of such contents. We can understand Schaffer as offering us guidance about 
how to select the relevantly privileged basis from other candidate tessellations. The basic 
tessellation is complete, minimal, and treats the right concrete objects as mereologically 
fundamental.  
Schaffer expects to find at least one complete yet minimal tessellation for any candidate 
contents. Let CR be the mereological fusion of all concrete objects in R. Then, trivially, any 
selection that counts CR as a tile is complete: fix the intrinsic character of this maximal concrete 
object and we fix all the contents of R. If CR is our only tile, there is no threat of redundancy. The 
result is a (indeed, the) monistic, or single-tile, tessellation of my office contents. More generally, 
since any candidate contents come with some uniquely maximal fusion, each should bring along 
one monistic tessellation.  
This monistic tessellation need not be the only tessellation on offer, though. In the case of 
my office, candidate pluralistic tessellations swap maximal tile CR for multiple localized parts. 
Suppose Ava’s intrinsic properties are freely recombinable with those of, say, the rug and my 
desk. Then we cannot cover all the contents of my office with Ava as our only tile: fixing Ava’s 
intrinsic properties goes no way at all towards pinning down, say, this decorative weaving 
beneath her. For a complete covering, our pluralistic proposal needs some additional 
ingredient(s). Nevertheless, any addition should be minimal. To avoid redundancy, we might try 
pairing Ava with just one other tile, her mereological complement CR\A. Intuitively, CR\A is the 
biggest concrete entity “left” when we “subtract” Ava from CR: it is a proper part of CR that 
subsumes the rug, my desk, and various other objects as proper parts of its own. If even whole 
CR\A’s intrinsic properties are freely recombinable with Ava’s, then these two tiles together will 
count as minimal in Schaffer’s sense.  
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Even if they do, though, the office may well have other pluralistic tessellations. Other 
candidates attempt to decompose CR\A, and maybe even Ava herself, into further collectively 
complete, mutually independent parts of their own. As far as the tiling constraint is concerned, all 
complete yet minimal decompositions are on a par. Schaffer deems them incompatible in this 
sense: we cannot include all of their tiles. Rival candidates treat different concrete objects as 
mereologically fundamental: some start from smaller tiles and build up to complex wholes, others 
start from larger tiles and factor out smaller parts, and doing both would be redundant. Likewise, 
if there are multiple candidate tessellations for our cosmos, they will disagree not about which 
concrete objects exist, nor about their divisions into parts and wholes, but about which of these 
objects are the mereologically fundamental tiles for our cosmos.  
For Schaffer, the relevantly privileged tessellation not only limns but metaphysically 
explains actual mereological structure, tracing the worldly relations of dependence between 
wholes and parts. If there are multiple tessellations of my office contents, they all agree about the 
patterns of or modal coordination between various wholes and parts in R. Across the space of 
metaphysical possibilities, we find a whole just like CR if and only if we find proper parts just like 
Ava and her complement CR\A—and the own smaller parts to boot. Still, Schaffer thinks, we can 
ask a further question: Does CR have this decoration because of the prior configuration of its 
constituent parts? Or, alternatively, are Ava and other localized parts mere derivative aspects of 
whole, CR, whose prior character ultimately explains their various local features? Answering 
amounts to selecting a uniquely basic tessellation for my office.  
Similarly, uncovering the genuine metaphysical basis for our cosmos means distinguishing 
the tessellation that (best) reflects the actual order of metaphysical explanation among all actual 
concrete existents. This basic tessellation selects as mereologically fundamental tiles all and only 
those objects that are, in fact, the “ultimate grounds on which all else depends” (Schaffer 2010b, 
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346). Which tessellation of cosmic contents reveals the actual metaphysical basis for physical 
reality? Shaffer distinguishes what he takes to be two exclusive, exhaustive theses about worldly 
metaphysical structure. According to priority pluralism, the basic tessellation selects multiple 
mutually independent tiles from among all cosmic contents. Together, these localized concrete 
objects collectively ground the complete decoration of space-time. According to Schaffer’s own 
priority monism, in contrast, the basic tessellation is monistic: it selects our cosmos C as the 
unique mereologically fundamental object. C’s own global intrinsic state not only necessitates but 
grounds the concrete decorations of smaller space-time regions.  
3. Schaffer’s case for priority monism  
Each of priority pluralism and priority monism is compatible with the claim that our 
cosmos has multiple tessellations; the theses disagree about which tessellation is also relevantly 
privileged. But while completeness and minimality are merely necessary, not sufficient conditions 
on Schaffer’s base, these end up doing a good deal of work in his case for priority monism. 
Specifically, Schaffer relies on this consequence of the tiling constraint: if our cosmic contents are 
without any pluralistic tessellation (at all), then we certainly cannot hope to find any pluralistic 
tessellation that is also privileged in the further way priority pluralists expect. That is, if a monistic 
tessellation is the only complete but minimal selection on offer, then pluralism about fundamental 
ontology is not an option.  
As a result, Schaffer devotes much of his attention to showing that our cosmos does, or at 
least might, defy pluralistic tessellation. His central argument moves from this purported defiance 
to priority monism. In brief: some (actual or metaphysically possible) cosmic contents are such 
that, on pain of incompleteness, we must include their maximal mereological sum among our 
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covering tiles. But then, on pain of redundancy, we cannot include any other tiles besides. For 
these contents, the only tessellation on offer is the monistic one.  
More exactly, Schaffer (2010a) offers two versions of this argument. The first starts from a 
bolder premise about the actual character of our cosmos:  
(1) The only complete but minimal selection (from all actual cosmic contents) is monistic: it 
comprises exactly one, maximal concrete object.   
The tiling constraint adds a modest commitment of pluralism: 
(2) If priority pluralism is true, then at least one selection (from actual cosmic contents) is 
complete, minimal, and comprises multiple concrete objects.  
From (1) and (2), we get: 
(3) Therefore, priority pluralism is not true. 
For Schaffer, priority pluralism and priority monism are the only options, and he expects his 
interlocutors to agree: 
(4) Either priority pluralism is true, or priority monism is. 
Whatever their differences, all sides in his debate expect some privileged basis to ground 
everything else; the relevant disagreement is over which concrete object(s) to include. Combined, 
(3) and (4) yield: 
(5) Priority monism is true. 
Schaffer’s second version starts from a more modest claim about actual cosmic character. 
For the sake of argument, Schaffer is willing to grant that our actual cosmic contents do have 
some pluralistic tessellation. Even so, he takes reflection on even actual subcosmic contents to 
show that our entire cosmos at least could defy pluralistic tessellation. That is: 
(1ʹ) For some metaphysically possible cosmic contents, the only complete but minimal 
selection from among these contents is monistic. 
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Now, strictly speaking, priority pluralism and priority monism are competing theses about actual 
worldly structure. Still, according to Schaffer, either thesis is true only if it is necessarily so. And so 
he combines (1ʹ) with a modalized variant of (2): 
(2ʹ) If priority pluralism is true, then, for any possible cosmic contents, at least one selection 
from among these contents is complete, minimal, and comprises multiple concrete 
objects.  
Then the argument unfolds as before.   
 Schaffer devotes most of his attention to defending (1) and (1ʹ). Specifically, he offers sub-
arguments from internal relatedness and emergence to show that some (actual or possible) cosmic 
contents defy decomposition into any complete and minimal plurality. I will return to some 
aspects of his sub-arguments in due course. For now, though, there is a more pressing issue to 
consider: Schaffer’s overarching argument rests on an internally inconsistent characterization of 
priority pluralism.  
Schaffer points to contemporary Humeanism as a paradigmatic example of priority 
pluralism. He even uses the doctrine of Humean supervenience to help motivate the tiling 
constraint as a necessary condition on metaphysically basic objects. On his reading, this doctrine 
describes a “Democritean” plurality: mutually independent elemental tiles, arrayed in space-
time, and collectively covering all cosmic contents (Schaffer 2010a, 53n; Schaffer 2010b 350). 
Prima facie, then, he accepts something along the lines of this conditional:  
(6) Humean supervenience is true only if priority pluralism is. 
Now, strictly speaking, (6) is stronger than we need. The doctrine of Humean 
supervenience is, as its name suggests, a supervenience thesis: for Humeans, “all else” supervenes 
on some spatiotemporal “mosaic” of concrete “elements” (Lewis 1986, ix). Humeans endorsing 
this thesis expect all cosmic contents to reduce—in some minimal sense—to a plurality of 
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elements. Still, it does not follow that these elements are the ultimate grounds of all else in the 
sense Schaffer has in mind: Humeans need not accept his hyper-intensional, priority-based 
conception of metaphysical explanation to begin with (cf. Miller 2015).  
Those who do not, already reject premise (4): nothing at all is basic in Schaffer’s sense. 
From Schaffer’s perspective, then, they are not even engaged in his same metaphysical project. 
Note, though, that these Humeans still can distinguish some objectively privileged plurality: from 
among all concrete objects, their elements are minimal bearers of elite “perfectly natural” states 
(Lewis 1986, ix). They might even distinguish their elements as mereologically fundamental in 
some entirely respectable sense—just not in any sense that requires mereologically fundamental 
objects to ground the rest. 
According to Schaffer, though, at least some Humean pluralists do seek to ground cosmic 
contents in some plurality of prior elements. And for the sake of argument, we can grant this—in 
fact, we can grant even (6) itself, without qualification. Our deeper concern is orthogonal to any 
qualms about Schaffer’s additions to the tiling constraint. At its root is not (6) but a weaker 
consequence, given (2):  
(6*) If Humean supervenience is true, then some selection of multiple concrete objects is 
complete and minimal.4   
Schaffer expects all endorsing Humean supervenience—no matter what they say about his sort of 
metaphysical explanation—to accept (6*). But (6*) is false: Humeans do not even aim for elements 
that are complete and minimal in Schaffer’s senses. Elements of the Humean mosaic do not 
suffice for cosmic contents, and—crucially—this is so even though these contents globally 
supervene on the Humean mosaic.    
 
4 This is a claim about actual cosmic contents, which is sufficient for our purposes; presumably, though, Schaffer also 
accepts a modalized variant of (6*). 
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4. Humean supervenience  
For Humeans, concrete reality is a spatiotemporal mosaic of localized concrete elements: 
points or minimal regions of space-time itself, or occupants of these. External spatiotemporal 
relations connect distinct elements, imposing geometrical structure on the global whole. These 
spatiotemporal ones, though, are the only fundamental relations to be found: no other necessary 
connections coordinate the local states of spatiotemporally separated elements. Instead, each 
elemental part has some intrinsic character of its own, modally insulated from external factors. 
More specifically, Humeans restrict their non-relational perfectly natural states to purely 
qualitative, or freely recombinable, intrinsic properties. 
As a result, Schaffer counts Humeans’ elements as minimal: if there are elemental entities 
of the sort Humeans describe, they are modally independent in the way that matters for the tiling 
constraint.5 According to Schaffer, though, the antecedent of this conditional actually is, or at 
least very well could be, false. He takes his sub-argument from internal relatedness to show that 
some (actual or possible) cosmic contents defy decomposition into any minimal plurality of 
concrete objects; a fortiori, they defy decomposition into any plurality of Humean elements.  
If the physical world is—or even might be—gunky, then some actual or possible cosmic 
contents are without any smallest parts of the sort Humeans take to make up their space-time 
mosaic (Schaffer 2010a, 61). And even if the cosmos does have some indivisible elements, these 
need not be freely recombinable in the way Humeans expect. Some (anti-Humean) causal 
essentialists, for example, include irreducibly modal, mutually constraining powerful qualities 
 
5 For clarity of presentation, I am granting that Humeans’ elements are mutually independent and then going on to 
argue that such minimal elements are not complete in Schaffer’s sense. The essential point, though, is that Humeans 
reject the tiling constraint’s conjunction of completeness and minimality: which particular conjunct(s) they end up 
rejecting may vary depending on how we unpack these conditions. One interpretational choice concerns the link 
between the minimality condition’s claims about “ways” entities can be and the completeness condition’s claims 
about the intrinsic properties of these entities or some whole(s) subsuming them—see Schaffer 2010a, 40; cf. Schaffer 
2010b.   
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among the intrinsic properties of subworldly bearers (Schaffer 2010b, 362ff). If they are right, 
then the basic elemental decoration in one part of the world can modally constrain, and even 
might suffice for, that elsewhere. What goes for small elements goes for bigger complexes: 
according to the sub-argument from internal relatedness, (all) proper parts of our cosmos are or 
could be interdependent in a way that precludes decomposition into any complete yet minimal 
plurality. Thus, at least one of (1) and (1ʹ) is true. 
Moreover, even if Humeans can identify some minimal plurality, Schaffer takes his sub-
argument from emergence to show that no such plurality will be complete (Schaffer 2010a, 50ff). 
Thanks to quantum entanglement, there are emergent physical systems: wholes with quantum 
states for which the intrinsic properties and arrangements of their proper parts do not 
metaphysically suffice. To cover the cosmos, then, any tessellation will need to include at least 
some non-elemental wholes among its tiles. According to Schaffer, in fact, our entire cosmos itself 
probably is, but at the very least could be, an entangled system, with some emergent global state 
over and above the intrinsic properties and arrangements of any subcosmic parts. In that case, 
the only complete tessellation selects a single, strictly maximal tile, the cosmos itself. Again, at 
least one of (1) and (1ʹ) is true, and priority monists are off to the races.  
Interestingly, though, we do not need any claims of actual entanglement, or either of 
Schaffer’s sub-arguments more generally, to show that Humean elements fail to satisfy his tiling 
constraint. For Humeans, everything else supervenes on the spatiotemporal mosaic of freely 
recombinable elements, but it does not follow that “duplicating all these entities, while preserving 
their fundamental relations, metaphysically suffices to duplicate the cosmos and its contents” 
(Schaffer 2010a, 39). In fact, Humeans (at least implicitly) reject any commitment to such 
metaphysical sufficiency.  
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For Humeans, basic truths about our world attribute occurrent qualities to localized 
objects. Even so, there are various non-basic truths about the world, including truths about what, 
physically speaking, could or would happen to objects under various non-actual circumstances. 
And so the cosmos includes some contents for which no proper parts collectively suffice. Among 
the contents of our actual cosmos C, for example, is this small, pellet-shaped object, S. S is 
disposed to dissolve in water: under the right wet circumstances, some of S’s constituent 
molecules would separate and disperse. Even for Humeans, then, S’s complete local physical 
state includes a soluble disposition.  
Let ea,…, el be all those elements that, for our Humeans, make up C. C’s complete 
elemental decoration is the distribution of perfectly natural intrinsic properties across these 
elements. S’s own local elemental decoration is the distribution of perfectly natural intrinsic 
properties across all and only those elements among ea,…, el that are also parts of S. According 
to Humeans, S’s elemental decoration suffices for S’s complete intrinsic character. That is, let S’s 
elemental duplicates be all metaphysically possible objects with S’s same elemental decoration. 
Then across the space of metaphysical possibilities, all elemental duplicates of S share, say, this 
same molecular structure. Even so, S’s elemental decoration does not metaphysically necessitate 
its more complete—that is, soluble—physical character.  
As a matter of fact, our own actual laws link S’s intrinsic structure to some soluble 
disposition.6 For Humeans, then, all actual intrinsic duplicates of S, here in our world, are 
soluble. Indeed, all duplicates of S in worlds with laws sufficiently like our own are too. Still, there 
are other duplicates of S, in other metaphysically possible worlds, that are disposed to behave 
 
6 For more on Humeans’ treatment of dispositions, see Langton and Lewis 1998; I also discuss this dispositional case 
in Miller 2019. See Shumener 2019 for a general discussion of the non-intrinsic character of Humean laws. See 
Schaffer 2013 for more on the role of laws in his monistic framework (cf. Miller 2014a).  
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differently—their laws link S’s microphysical structure to some insoluble causal profile instead. 
To duplicate all of S’s intuitively “local” features more broadly, then, we need to duplicate its 
elemental decoration and preserve some of our own laws. 
 Now for Humeans, the physical laws, like everything else, supervene on the Humean 
mosaic. On one account, more specifically, laws just are or express prominent patterns in the 
actual features of objects. It follows that all elemental duplicates of S in worlds exhibiting global 
patterns sufficiently like our own share S’s same local physical state. One consequence is that any 
metaphysically possible world featuring a cosmic elemental duplicate of C exhibits all and only the 
global patterns we find in our actual one. Any such world shares our actual laws; as a result, any 
elemental duplicates of S in such a world share S’s soluble state.  
Nevertheless, even all our actual elements taken together do not metaphysically 
necessitate our laws. Merely duplicating ea,…, el, while preserving their arrangement, does not 
guarantee the same global patterns, and so duplicating these elements does not suffice to 
duplicate S’s soluble character. To see this, note that, for Humeans, the space of metaphysical 
possibilities includes subcosmic elemental duplicates of C. Consider metaphysically possible world 
w, featuring concrete whole C*. C* is the mereological fusion of elements ea*,…, el*, and the 
distribution of perfectly natural intrinsic properties across these elements matches the distribution 
we find across ea,…, el in C. But whereas C is maximal in our world, C* is not the maximal 
concrete object in w. Instead, some larger whole Cw conjoins C* with distinct concrete entities 
em*,…, ez*. Since C* has the same elemental decoration as C does in our world, ea*,…, el* exhibit 
the same internal patterns we find among ea,…, el in our actual world. But since ea,…, el are all 
the concrete elements that exist in our world, these internal patterns are also strictly global 
regularities here. In contrast, Cw’s own elemental decoration extends beyond the bounds of C*. 
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If the decoration outside those bounds is sufficiently different from what we find among 
ea*,…, el*, then w’s global patterns will not match—and may even be incompatible with—the 
lawful generalizations in our world. In that case, not everything with S’s same elemental 
decoration will be similarly soluble in w. Indeed, w’s own laws may fail to assign soluble physical 
states to anything at all in Cw. But then, since C’s own contents include at least one soluble pellet, 
not all of C’s contents will be common to its elemental duplicate C*. That is, duplicating—as in 
ea*,…, el*—all the intrinsic properties of ea,…, el, along with their fundamental spatiotemporal 
relations, will not metaphysically suffice to duplicate all C’s contents, since it will not suffice to 
duplicate the soluble ones.  Given the tiling constraint, then, ea,…, el are not metaphysically basic 
objects in our world.  
More generally, this standard Humean treatment of globally supervenient contents is 
incompatible with (6*)—at least one of (2) and (6) must go. Duplicating all actual elements does 
not suffice to duplicate the globally supervenient laws, and so does not suffice to duplicate those 
cosmic contents, such as S’s soluble character, parasitic on such laws. Moreover, no other 
plurality of non-elemental concrete objects fares any better. On Humeans’ account of intrinsic 
properties, any subcosmic object’s elemental decoration does necessitate its intrinsic character. But 
then it follows that, for any plurality of subcosmic objects, duplicating those objects’ intrinsic 
properties, along with their spatiotemporal relations, at most suffices to duplicate only those 
cosmic contents already necessitated by Humeans’ smallest elements. So, for Humeans, no 
plurality of concrete is complete in Schaffer’s sense.7   
 
7 Schaffer (2010a) does not say what he takes cosmic contents to include, but he seems to assume that C’s contents 
make true, in the sense of necessitating (grounding), physical truths about our world (cf. Schaffer 2010c). On my framing, 
Humeans are granting that, whatever exactly they are, Schaffer’s cosmic contents suffice for physical truths about, 
say, solubility—and thus include S’s soluble character. As a result, our Humeans deny that any elemental plurality 
necessitates all C’s cosmic contents: non-cosmic intrinsic duplicate C* lacks some. Alternatively, Humeans can limit 
C’s contents to the intrinsic features that, on their account, are necessitated by its elemental decoration—excluding 
soluble S. In that case, C’s contents do have some complete monistic tessellation (and pluralistic ones too), but there 
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5. Non-piecemeal Humeanism 
Initially, at least, the considerations in §4 might seem to strengthen the case for priority 
monism. In his sub-argument from internal relatedness, Schaffer contends that if (for instance) 
anti-Humean causal essentialism is correct, then no plurality of concrete objects satisfies the tiling 
constraint. §4 suggests, likewise, that if some standard Humean commitments are correct, we end 
up in the same situation. In the first case, Schaffer distinguishes two live options: either we give 
up on finding any complete but minimal basis for cosmic contents, or else—as he and likeminded 
reductionists prefer—we distinguish C as the uniquely basic object. And so, likewise, we might 
expect §4 to present a similar choice. In fact, though, the dialectical situation is more complicated 
for Humeans: extending our earlier reasoning against pluralism shows that the soluble contents 
in §4 have no monistic tessellation either.  
C and C* have the same elemental decoration. For Humeans, it follows that a property is 
intrinsic to C only if it is intrinsic to C* as well. Duplicating all of C*’s intrinsic properties does not 
metaphysically suffice to duplicate S’s soluble character—after all, there is nothing soluble 
anywhere in Cw. So duplicating all of C’s (same) intrinsic properties does not metaphysically 
suffice to duplicate S’s local soluble state either. That is, even a selection that includes the whole 
cosmos C does not count as complete in Schaffer’s sense. Thus, some of C’s globally supervenient 
contents defy decomposition into any—pluralistic or monistic—tessellation. Schaffer’s tiling 
constraint leaves Humeans with only one option: nothing at all is metaphysically basic.  
 
are physical truths (e.g. about S’s solubility) external to cosmic contents so circumscribed. The disagreement with 
Schaffer is then about the relation of truth-making linking these to C. For Humeans, such truths are not necessitated 
by, but merely supervene on, the mosaic, while Schaffer conflates this supervenience relation with necessitation or 
“entailment” (cf. Lewis 2001, MacBride 2005, Heil 2006). However exactly Humeans deal with familiar globally 
supervenient contents (or truths), the key point (in §5) is that they can use this same sort of move to respond to 
Schaffer’s sub-arguments from internal relatedness and emergence. 
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This result need not trouble Humeans: as we mentioned earlier, they already may reject 
Schaffer’s characterization of basic objects. Still, the current consequence is stronger: in essence, 
Humeans—or at least those Humeans accommodating globally supervenient cosmic contents of 
the sort described in §4—must deny that anything is metaphysically basic in Schaffer’s sense. 
Moreover, this consequence does prove problematic for priority monists within the context of 
Schaffer’s broader argument, since he cites Humean supervenience to help motivate his tiling 
constraint.  
Schaffer starts with the premise that commitment to completeness and minimality is 
common across various broadly reductive metaphysical frameworks, including Humean 
pluralism. He then goes on to argue that Humeans and other reductive pluralists cannot preserve 
all their antecedent commitments while also accommodating the metaphysical structure of our 
cosmos—which does, or at least could, include internally related or emergent ingredients. More 
specifically, if we want to retain completeness and minimality as necessary conditions on the 
reductive basis, we must sacrifice pluralism about fundamental mereology.  
If Humeans are not interested in Schafferian completeness to begin with, though, we 
undercut Schaffer’s starting point. Why should we expect any concrete objects to count as 
metaphysically basic in the first place?8 Note, too, that we might harbor doubts about Schaffer’s 
particular characterization of basic objects without having reservations about metaphysical 
explanation more generally. Perhaps some mereologically fundamental—even ultimately prior—
concrete elements “cover” C insofar as they collectively subvene all its contents. If they do not 
also jointly necessitate these contents, these elements are not complete in the sense at issue in the 
 
8 To put it another way, Humeans might grant Schaffer this conditional claim: if anything at all is metaphysically 
basic, then the cosmos is uniquely so. For them, the antecedent is false, but the conditional (if true) is uninteresting.  
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tiling constraint—and so, according to Schaffer, they do not qualify as metaphysically basic. But 
why should we expect any concrete objects to count as metaphysically basic in Schaffer’s sense?9   
The immediate upshot is that Schaffer fails to offer his pluralist opponents a non-
question-begging argument for monism. But Humeans’ distinction between global supervenience 
and the sort of metaphysical sufficiency at issue in Schaffer’s tiling constraint also provides 
pluralists with resources for answering Schaffer’s own positive arguments for (1) (and (1ʹ)). There 
is an important possibility—one that Humeans can or should embrace—that Schaffer simply 
overlooks when drawing his monistic conclusion. On this alternative, roughly, the cosmic 
ingredients that inspire Schaffer’s sub-arguments from internal relatedness and emergence are 
analogous to Humeans’ globally supervenient contents from §4.  
Consider again the sub-argument from internal relatedness. According to Schaffer, 
roughly, some (actual or possible) cosmic contents comprise internally related, mutually 
constraining concrete objects. Neither these objects, nor their parts, are minimal. To completely 
cover these integrated cosmic contents, we need to include some larger (even cosmic) whole 
among our metaphysically basic objects. For example, some anti-Humean causal essentialists 
deny that we can separate S’s categorical base from its dispositional profile. There is not any non-
soluble duplicate of S anywhere in the space of all metaphysical possibilities. Instead, S’s intrinsic 
properties—and those of its parts—are irreducibly modal powerful qualities.  
For such anti-Humeans, it follows that S is not relevantly recombinable with other cosmic 
contents. There is no metaphysically possible world in which some intrinsic duplicate of S is 
 
9 That is, perhaps Schaffer is right that broadly reductive outlooks do share a common conception of basic objects 
but wrong about the details of the conception. If so, Humean reductionists might dispute even our conditionally 
monistic moral from the previous note. We can trace cosmic contents to some prior plurality of basic elements 
properly understood—never mind that they are not “basic” by Schaffer’s own (misguided) lights. In the background 
here are questions about what precisely (Humean) reductionism comes to (cf. Beebee 2000, MacBride 2005, Wilson 
2015).  
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submerged in water, nothing interferes, and yet no subsequently dispersed sodium and chloride 
atoms are to be found anywhere in space-time. The causally potent intrinsic properties of S and 
our water, plus their initial arrangement, metaphysically constrain our cosmic contents 
elsewhere.  
According to our Humeans, in contrast, the perfectly natural intrinsic properties of S’s 
elemental parts are purely qualitative. The space of metaphysical possibilities includes some 
duplicate of S in a world entirely devoid of soluble contents. In fact, such a world might include 
duplicates of all of ea,…, el. To duplicate our actual soluble contents, then, we need some further 
addition. According to some non-essentialist anti-Humeans, what we need are external, 
constraining physical laws over and above the categorical decoration of space-time. The laws at a 
world are not entailed by, and do not even supervene on, the intrinsic decorations and 
arrangements of objects in space-time: they impose some additional external constraint on these.  
As we already have seen, though, this is not the only option. Humeans agree that S’s 
elemental decoration does not metaphysically suffice for its own soluble physical character. 
Moreover, the elemental decoration of C itself does not either: we can duplicate all of ea,…, el 
and yet fail to duplicate any soluble cosmic contents. So it is not the case that these elements are 
both minimal and complete in Schaffer’s sense. For Humeans, though, this is no cause for alarm: 
laws, and any cosmic contents parasitic on these laws, can and do still supervene on the elemental 
mosaic.  
Humeans still can accommodate some of the data inspiring causal essentialists: they can 
grant that S in fact bears some intuitively local—though not strictly intrinsic—constraining, 
soluble disposition. They can and do even accept a sort of cosmic causal essentialism: while each of 
ea,…, el individually is modally inert, their cosmic combination is not. Any similarly maximal 
intrinsic duplicate of C ties S’s categorical basis to this soluble character. Crucially, though, there 
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are no necessary conditions between distinct existences.10 Intuitively, any connections between S 
and other parts of their cosmos trace to necessary connections between each of these subcosmic 
individuals and one subsuming non-distinct existence: the cosmic whole of which each is a part.  
Humeans can develop a similar response to Schaffer’s sub-argument from emergence. 
According to Schaffer, distinct entangled wholes, with importantly different quantum states, can 
have, as parts, particles with all and only the same intrinsic properties arranged in the same way. 
For example, duplicating the intrinsic properties of particles p1 and p2, while preserving their 
spatiotemporal relations, does not metaphysically suffice to duplicate the (singlet) quantum state 
of the pair. According to Schaffer, then, Humeans’ Democritean base fails to meet the 
completeness condition (Schaffer 2010a, 51-52). That is, (i) we can find an elemental duplicate of 
our p1-p2 pair with a triplet whole state instead; and so (ii) duplicating the intrinsic properties of 
all elemental parts of the cosmos, while preserving their spatiotemporal relations, does not 
metaphysically suffice to duplicate our whole’s (singlet) quantum state.  
Now, strictly speaking, (ii)’s claim of global incompleteness does not follow 
straightforwardly from (i)—not unless we also stipulate that p1 and p2 are the only elements in C. 
But regardless, even (ii) does not get us to (iii) the (singlet) quantum state of our whole does not 
globally supervene on the distribution of perfectly natural intrinsic properties across, and 
spatiotemporal relations among, all elements of the mosaic. But (iii) is what we need to get 
Humeans worried: we need the space of metaphysical possibilities to include some cosmic 
duplicate of C that does not also feature our singlet pair.  
In order to get there, though, we need some argument to show that Humeans cannot 
treat the coordinated dispositions and behaviors of individual singlet and triplet particles, and 
 
10 See Wilson 2015 for discussion of this Humean dictum. See also MacBride 2005 for an argument that there is still 
a tension between Humean commitments and Lewisian truthmaking understood in terms of global supervenience.    
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thus the entangled quantum states of subsuming wholes, as they do our globally supervenient 
dispositional profiles from §4.11 On that sort of proposal, any elemental duplicate of our p1-p2 
pair within a global mosaic relevantly like our actual one has this same singlet pair state. But 
Humeans need not grant, for instance, that some cosmic elemental duplicate of our p1-p2 pair 
will have that same state. As a result, they antecedently reject some key modal intuitions that help 
to motivate Schaffer’s premise of (possible) cosmic emergence. What they need is some non-
question-begging argument as to why these intuitions are worth accommodating.12 
Humeans who adopt the sort of approach I have been sketching reject a piecemeal 
conception of worldly structure. In general, they deny that we can cut out and preserve the 
contents of some proper part of the cosmos while freely varying its external accompaniment. 
Most of the time, preserving the elemental decoration of some proper part of our cosmos does 
not metaphysically suffice to preserve its more complete contents: thus, some lonely or maximal 
elemental duplicate of some actual subcosmic object may have some different local features. 
Likewise, non-piecemeal Humeans deny that we can duplicate all our actual elements in C*, 
 
11 I offer more detailed discussions of this strategy in Miller 2014b and Miller 2018. 
12 In fairness, Schaffer does offer two other considerations to support of his claim that the cosmos is or could be 
entangled (Schaffer 2010a, 52ff). First, he claims that the space of all functions we could in principle use to represent 
C’s quantum state contains many more entangled candidates than unentangled ones: as a mathematical matter, our 
actual universal wave function is more likely entangled than not. Without some measure over the space of possible 
functions, however, this point is not compelling. Second, he quotes physicists who claim that all or most objects likely 
have interacted with one another—and so have undergone some entanglement interaction—throughout the course 
of history, justifying their inclusion in some universal system. I suspect the term ‘entanglement’ is being used in (at 
least) two senses in this discussion. Interactions between objects may well give us various grounds for considering 
them as parts of some larger causal system of interest. But whether such a system’s wave function exhibits and 
preserves the entangled mathematical character at issue here is a separate matter—one that also intersects with 
ongoing debates over the interpretation of quantum theory (cf. Ismael and Schaffer 2016, Miller 2018). Schaffer’s 
remaining consideration is the one I have been focusing on: he supports (1ʹ) with the intuition that (a duplicate of) 
some actually sub-cosmic entangled system (with all the same contents) is maximal in another metaphysically possible 
world. Our Humeans will resist this general move, at most accommodating some instances (or their appearances). 
Perhaps Schaffer thinks that Humean reductionists must or ought to accommodate some more general modal 
intuition here, but we need some further argument for that. The dialectical situation is a familiar one for Humeans, 
who are frequently criticized for failing to accommodate their opponents’ (anti-Humean) modal intuitions (cf. Beebee 
2000).  
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paste this alongside any addition we choose in Cw, and still perfectly replicate all actual contents 
of C*. The space of metaphysical possibilities may well include some non-cosmic duplicates of C 
with many or all of our same contents, but these are duplicates whose own accompaniments 
conform to the same global patterns we see here.  
Likewise, some possible maximal object may share many of the contents that actually 
belong to some proper part of our cosmos. Nevertheless, such contents may be underwritten by 
another array of subvening elements. The resulting situation parallels the one that arises for 
priority monists when they try to accommodate some possible non-maximal whole that, 
intuitively, replicates C’s actual contents. Despite their similarity in contents, such a whole will 
not count as a duplicate of C if, for monists, intrinsic duplicates must have the same grounds. In 
that case, our possible sub-cosmic whole will have an intrinsic property (of being grounded in 
some larger cosmos) that C lacks. Like our non-piecemeal Humeans, then, priority monists will 
need to distinguish the local contents of some part from those strictly intrinsic to it.13 
6. Taking stock: non-local basing without monism 
Schaffer claims to turn “on its head” Hume’s prohibition against necessary connections 
between distinct existences (Schaffer 2010b, 350). According to the Schafferian monist, there are 
or could be necessary connections all over the place; thus, no localized concrete objects are 
thoroughly distinct. Underwriting the interconnections between actual objects is a subsuming 
whole that is or could be over and above them all—and thus is and must be ultimately prior to 
each one. Nothing is distinct from the global base, so there is no need to balk at top-down 
necessitation from cosmic whole to proper parts. According to Schaffer, there is no need to balk 
 
13 Monists confront a general challenge when it comes to distinguishing intrinsic properties: see Sider 2007 and 
2008, Trogdon 2009, and Fisher 2015.   
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at necessary connections among separate proper parts either: they stand related by mutual 
dependence on a common base.  
Schaffer’s initial instinct, I think, is sound: coordination between parts reflects mutual 
connection with a broader subsuming base. Since the base is not entirely distinct from these 
parts, we can accommodate—and even expect, in the form of supervenience—some top-down 
modal connections within our structure. Schaffer is also right to insist that the global base is not a 
mere conjunction of independent elements. Our world is not a thoroughly “disconnected 
pluralistic heap” (Schaffer 2010b, 350). Some contents here—this pellet’s soluble disposition, or 
its component particle’s singlet state—are local manifestations of a more global basis. 
Nevertheless, Schaffer goes wrong when he assumes that, if it is to supervene on some 
plurality of elements, then the Humean mosaic must be a mere piecemeal conjunction of them. The 
same sort of mistake appears in various guises across anti-Humean critiques of Humean 
supervenience. We find it in depictions of Humeanism as a worldview on which we can freely 
“‘cut and paste’ parts of different worlds together, where the pieces being cut are given by a 
spatiotemporal boundary” (Maudlin 1998, 59). Likewise, we find it in characterizations of the 
Humean mosaic as—or as exhaustively “described” by—“a long conjunction” of particular facts, 
and in the slogan that, for Humeans, laws are mere conjunctions of—rather than generalizations 
over—their actual instances (Lange 2013, 259).  
More generally, anti-Humeans often move from the premise that—if we want to be realists 
about laws or causes or dispositions or quantum states—we should not conceive of the world as a 
mere conjunction, to the conclusion that we need some additional ingredients, over and above 
any Humean conjuncts, to furnish some necessary connections. Non-piecemeal Humeans resist 
precisely this move. In doing so, they highlight an important question for both sides: What is it 
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for some contents to be both locally manifest but globally based? In what sense can, some globally 
supervenient or even cosmically grounded features or facts belong entirely to this particular part?14  
Both non-piecemeal Humeans and priority monists face versions of this question, and this 
seems to me to be where the real work is to be done. Perhaps, ultimately, monists will turn out to 
be at some advantage when it comes to answering it. So far, though, I see no reason to think that 
Humeans’ commitment to global supervenience should make it more difficult for them—
Schaffer, certainly, does not offer any. If anything, in fact, I think the odds may be in Humeans’ 
favor here: arguably, at least, priority monists’ variety of non-local basing comes at too steep a 
cost.  
Non-piecemeal Humeans accommodate indirect, globally mediated coordination 
between separate parts of the world: these parts’ non-basic, locally manifest contents supervene 
on—and in that way constrain the general character of—the mosaic that subsumes them. In 
principle, Schaffer’s priority monists can accommodate more direct, dramatic interdependence 
between parts. Again suppose that, for monists, any duplicate of R must share its actual intrinsic 
property of being grounded in C. C is a whole that counts both R and its actual concrete 
accompaniment as parts. Thus, duplicating R suffices to duplicate not only C but R’s 
accompaniment in C. In other words, one proper part already necessitates all the others.  
Priority monists may want to be able to accommodate this sort of radical interdependence 
between parts, at least in principle. Presumably, though, they should not have to incorporate such 
interdependence, at least in any widespread manner, when characterizing our own world.15 
Indeed, priority monists also may want to accommodate the intuition that, at least in some cases, 
 
14 Or even more generally: What is the relationship between spatiotemporal and metaphysical structure? 
15 In fact, Schaffer (2010b) canvasses various characterizations of internal relatedness partly in order to distinguish 
more limited, intuitively plausible kinds of interdependence from this radical sort.  
 25 
we could find these same localized happenings within a cosmos that is otherwise very different 
from our own. The challenge, then, is to distinguish local features that—while in fact deriving 
from some prior cosmic state—are comparatively insensitive to external factors from those that 
belong to one part somehow more robustly in virtue of its relations to another. After all, the sub-
arguments from internal relatedness and emergence are supposed to highlight some distinctive 
interdependence between particular parts of our world.  
In short, priority monists, like our non-piecemeal Humeans, need to distinguish between 
locally manifest states that are more or less sensitive to external happenings. It is simply not clear, 
though, how monists can and should do so if all local states are grounded in some prior cosmic 
character. Non-piecemeal Humean pluralists, in contrast, have a ready answer. The mere 
conjunction of elements in this part of the world does metaphysically suffice for its strictly 
intrinsic, modally insulated core. But we also can find within it what we might suggestively 
characterize as locally holistic contents, over and above the local elemental decoration here. 
These contents supervene on the more global mosaic, and so are modally sensitive to basic 
elements elsewhere in space-time. Nevertheless, this sensitivity is not a manifestation of necessary 
connections between distinct existences. It merely reflects internal coordination between some 
localized part and a broader basis subsuming this—the elemental mosaic on which its contents, 
with all else, supervene.16 
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